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 Introduction 
 1 is chapter analyzes the place of modern 2 nance 1 in modern economic theories. 
Financial theory and economics are closely linked. Indeed, the integration of market 
analysis into economic theory in the 1960s was what enabled modern 2 nancial theory to 
emerge. While some works on what was to become modern 2 nancial theory had been 
produced prior to the 1960s, they were marginal 2 and did not yet constitute either an 
academic or a scienti2 c discipline; applied mathematics and empirical investigations 
into 2 nance existed, but these were isolated contributions, and most of them did not 
have a solid theoretical underpinning. 3 
 In order to analyze the place of 2 nance in economics, this chapter sets out to show 
how economics has in: uenced, and continues to in: uence, modern 2 nancial theory. 
 1 e chapter is structured as follows. 1 e 2 rst part focuses on the theoretical founda-
tions of modern 2 nancial theory. It analyzes the way modern probability theory and 
economics were linked together to create modern 2 nancial theory. 1 e second part 
presents the key works of the dominant paradigm of 2 nancial economics, which was 
built during the 1960s and the 1970s. It shows how major concepts and hypotheses from 
economics were integrated into mathematical models. 1 e third part looks at anomalies 
that have emerged since the end of the 1970s and are inconsistent with the dominant 
paradigm. It explains how 2 nancial economics has developed alternative theories—
2 nancial market microstructure and behavioral 2 nance—to resolve these anomalies. 
(However, as will be explained, these developments have not led to any signi2 cant modi-
2 cation of the dominant paradigm in 2 nancial economics, even if its foundations have 
been called into question.) 1 e last part deals with two major approaches born outside 
2 nancial economics—social studies of 2 nancial markets and econophysics—which are 
among the greatest challenges to the foundations of the dominant paradigm of 2 nancial 
economics today. 
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 The birth of modern financial theory: 
the role of economics and modern 
probability theory 
 Modern 2 nancial theory was born in the early 1960s. Two scienti2 c disciplines played a 
fundamental role in its emergence: modern probability theory and economics. 
 3 e role of modern probability theory 
 Modern 2 nancial theory is intimately bound up with modern probability theory, from 
which its emergence, main models, and results are inseparable. So close are the links 
that, further to the publications of  Harrison and Kreps ( 1979 ) and  Harrison and Pliska 
( 1981 ), 4 it could be suggested that economics has been dispossessed of 2 nancial theory, 
which has since resembled an application of modern probability theory ( MacKenzie 
 2006 : 140–1). Or, as posited by Davis and Etheridge, Harrison and Pliska’s article (1981) 
“has turned ‘2 nancial economics’ into ‘mathematical 2 nance’ ” ( Davis and Etheridge 
 2006 : 114). 
 Modern probability theory—that is, probability for continuous quantities in continu-
ous time—emerged in the 1930s ( Von Plato  1994 ) out of a number of works aimed at 
renewing traditional probability theory. 1 e development of the modern version of 
probability theory was directly based on measurement theory ( Shafer and Vovk  2001 ). 
1 e connection was made by Kolmogorov, who proposed the main founding concepts 
of this new branch of mathematics. 
 From these beginnings in the 1930s, modern probability theory developed and 
became increasingly in: uential. But it was not until aD er World War II that 
Kolmogorov’s axioms became the dominant paradigm in this discipline (Shafer and 
Vovk 2005: 54–5). It was also aD er World War II that the American probability school 
was born, led by Doob 5 and by Feller. 6 1 ese two writers had a major in: uence on the 
construction of modern probability theory, particularly through their two main 
books, published in the early 1950s, 7 which proved, on the basis of the framework laid 
down by Kolmogorov, all results obtained prior to the 1950s, thereby enabling them to 
be accepted and integrated into the discipline’s theoretical corpus. 1 ese 1950s works 
led to the creation of a stable corpus that was accessible to nonspecialists. From then 
on, the models and results of modern probability theory were used in the study of 
2 nancial markets in a more systematic manner, in particular by scholars educated in 
economics. 
 1 e 2 rst step in this development was the dissemination of mathematical tools ena-
bling the properties of random variables to be used and uncertainty reasoning to be 
developed. 1 e 2 rst two writers to use tools that came out of modern probability theory 
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to study 2 nancial markets were Harry Markowitz and A. D. Roy. In 1952 each published 
an article on the theory of portfolio choice theory. 8 Both used mathematical properties 
of random variables to build their model. 9 1 eir work was to re-prove a result that had 
long been known (and which was as old as the adage “Don’t put all your eggs in one bas-
ket”) using a new mathematical language, that of modern probability theory. 1 eir con-
tribution, then, lay not in the result of portfolio diversi2 cation, but in the use of this new 
mathematical language. 
 In 1958, Modigliani and Miller proceeded in the same manner: they used random 
variables in the analysis of an old question, the capital structure of companies, to dem-
onstrate that the value of a company is independent of its capital structure. 10 1 eir con-
tribution, like that of Markowitz and Roy, was to reformulate an old problem using the 
terms of modern probability theory. 
 From the 1960s on, a new stage was embarked upon: authors no longer limited them-
selves to proving past results using the mathematical formalisms of modern probability 
theory, but connected mathematical formalism with the main concepts of economics, 
particularly the concept of equilibrium, to create new theories. 
 3 e role of economics 
 1 e institutional birth of modern 2 nancial theory arose precisely from the integration 
of economics’ analysis framework into the study of 2 nancial markets ( Jovanovic  2008 ). 
1 is integration was the result of the formation in the early 1960s of a community of 
economists devoted to the analysis of 2 nancial markets. 
 Let us remember that until the 1960s, 2 nance in the United States was taught mainly 
in business schools. 1 e textbooks used were very practical and few of them touched on 
what became modern 2 nancial theory. 1 e research work that formed the basis of mod-
ern 2 nancial theory was carried out by isolated writers who were trained in economics 
or were surrounded by economists, such as Working, Cowles, Kendal, Roy, Markowitz, 
and so on. No university community devoted to the subject existed prior to the 1960s. 11 
During the 1960s and 1970s, training in American business schools changed radically, 
becoming more “rigorous.” 12 1 ey began to “academicize” themselves, recruiting 
increasing numbers of economics professors who taught in university economics 
departments, such as Miller ( Fama  2008 ). Similarly, prior to oK ering their own doctoral 
programs, business schools recruited doctorands who had been trained in university 
economics departments. 
 1 e recruitment of economists interested in questions of 2 nance unsettled teaching 
and research as hitherto practiced in business schools and inside the American Finance 
Association. 1 e new recruits brought with them their analysis frameworks, methods, 
hypotheses, and concepts, and also used the new mathematics that arose out of modern 
probability theory. 1 ese changes and their consequences were substantial enough for 
the American Finance Association to devote part of its annual meeting to them in two 
consecutive years, 1965 and 1966. 
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 At the 1965 annual meeting of the American Finance Association an entire session 
was devoted to the necessity to rethink courses in 2 nance curricula. Paul Wendt dis-
cussed the development of 2 nance and explained:
 As most of you are aware, a modern concept of technical market analysis is emerg-
ing which emphasizes the application of newer analytical techniques and computer 
technology to test traditional and new theories of stock price behavior. I am pre-
pared to accept the view that this is not only a promising research area, but that 
graduate business school students should be introduced to these emerging theories 
and techniques of analyzing security market behavior. ( Wendt  1966 : 421–2) 
 At the 1966 annual meeting, the new President of the American Finance Association 
presented a paper on “1 e State of the Finance Field,” in which he talked of the changes 
being brought about by “the creators of the New Finance [who] become impatient with 
the slowness with which traditional materials and teaching techniques move along” 
( Weston  1967 : 539). 13 Although these changes elicited many debates ( Jovanovic  2008 ; 
 MacKenzie  2006 ;  Poitras and Jovanovic  2007 , 2010;  Whitley  1986a ,  1986b ), 14 none suc-
ceeded in challenging the global movement. 
 1 e antecedents of these new actors were a determining factor in the institutionaliza-
tion of modern 2 nancial theory. 1 eir background in economics allowed them to add 
theoretical content to the empirical results that had been accumulated since the 1930s 
and to the mathematical formalisms that had arisen from modern probability theory. In 
other words, economics brought the theoretical content that had been missing. Here are 
two examples to illustrate this change: the eL  cient markets theory and the CAPM. 
 1 e eL  cient markets theory, 15 which can be considered as the 2 rst theory built by 
2 nancial economists, was initially referred to as the “random walk theory.” 1 is term 
stresses the importance of mathematical formalism in the way issues were tackled before 
the discipline was constituted. 1 e theory was 2 rst formulated by  Fama ( 1965 )—we will 
return to it in the next section—who developed the idea that the random walk model 
would test two properties of competitive economic balance: the absence of marginal 
pro2 t and a security’s equilibrium value. According to the eL  cient markets theory, if the 
model used by investors to evaluate the value of the security does not use all available 
information, it will be possible to make an arbitrage. 1 us, in an eL  cient market, the 
equalization between the price and the equilibrium value means that all available infor-
mation is included in the price. Consequently, it is not possible to use past information 
to predict future price changes: present and future prices are independent of past prices. 
For this reason, in an eL  cient market, stock price changes must be as random as the 
arrival of new information. In other words, according to this theory, the random walk 
model can simulate the dynamic evolution of equilibrium prices in a competitive mar-
ket. In this way, the eL  cient markets theory made it possible to link the mathematical 
model of a stochastic process with one of the keystones of economics, the concept of 
economic equilibrium. 
 In 1970, Fama based the eL  cient markets theory on another mathematical concept 
that came from modern probability theory: the martingale model. 16 For Fama’s pur-
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poses, the most important attraction of the martingale formalism was its explicit refer-
ence to a set of information. 17 As such, the martingale model could be used to test the 
implication of the eL  cient markets theory that, if all available information is used, the 
expected pro2 t is nil. 1 is idea led to the de2 nition of an eL  cient market that is gener-
ally used nowadays: “a market in which prices always ‘fully re: ect’ available information 
is called ‘eL  cient’ ” ( Fama  1970 : 383). Here again, the part played by economics in the 
mathematical de2 nition of the martingale model underlines economics’ key role in the 
creation of the structure of modern 2 nancial theory. 
 1 e second illustration of how economics brought theoretical content to mathemati-
cal formalisms is the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). In 2 nance, the CAPM is used 
to determine a theoretically appropriate required rate of return for an asset, if the asset is 
to be added to an already well-diversi2 ed portfolio, given the asset’s non-diversi2 able 
risk. 1 e model takes into account the asset’s sensitivity to non-diversi2 able risk (also 
known as systematic risk or market risk or beta), as well as the expected return of the 
market and the expected return of a theoretical risk-free asset. 1 is model is used for 
pricing an individual security or a portfolio. It has become the cornerstone of modern 
2 nance ( Fama and French  2004 ). 1 e CAPM is also built using an approach familiar to 
economists for three reasons. First, some sort of maximizing behavior on the part of 
participants in a market is assumed; second, the equilibrium conditions under which 
such markets will clear are investigated; third, markets are perfectly competitive. 
Consequently, the CAPM provided a standard 2 nancial theory for market equilibrium 
under uncertainty. 
 1 e imbrication of the mathematical formalisms that emerged from modern proba-
bility theory and economics concepts theory in particular, was a crucial factor in the 
birth of 2 nancial economics. By linking 2 nancial facts with economic concepts, the eL  -
cient market theory enabled 2 nancial economics to become a proper sub2 eld of eco-
nomics and consequently a scienti2 c 2 eld. As we will now see, the heart of the dominant 
paradigm was constructed during this period on the same model as the eL  cient markets 
theory and the CAPM. 
 The constitution of the dominant 
paradigm of financial economics 
during the 1960s and 1970s 
 1 e decade of the 1960s saw the creation of the dominant paradigm of 2 nancial eco-
nomics. 18 Contributions were numerous and substantive. It should be noted that almost 
all those who contributed to the construction of this paradigm have been rewarded by 
the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, 19 a measure 
of this paradigm’s importance in economics. Five individuals—Harry M. Markowitz, 
William F. Sharpe, Merton H. Miller, Robert C. Merton, and Myron S. Scholes—have 
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received this distinction for contributions solely in the realm of 2 nancial economics. 
Markowitz, Sharpe, and Miller were joint winners in 1990, and Merton and Scholes 
received the award jointly in 1997. 20 In addition, four other Nobel Prize winners—Paul 
A. Samuelson (1970), John R. Hicks (1972), Franco Modigliani (1985), and Daniel 
Kahneman (2002)—made signi2 cant contributions to 2 nancial economics but were 
awarded the prize for an overall impact that covers a wider range of the economic 
sciences. 
 1 e dominant paradigm is made up of four main theories: the eL  cient market theory, 
the CAPM, 21 the mean-variance portfolio optimization model, and the option pricing 
model. I will now present these brie: y. 
 As explained above, the eL  cient markets theory  22 considers that stock market prices 
: uctuate randomly because all information is fully re: ected in the prices. Although 
detailed empirical observations about the random character of security prices stretch 
back to the nineteenth century ( Jovanovic and Le Gall  2001 ,  Poitras  2006 ), these notions 
were crystallized into the basis of the eL  cient markets theory during the 1960s.  Working 
( 1956 ) was the 2 rst author to suggest a theoretical explanation of the random character 
of stock market prices; he established an explicit link between the unpredictable arrival 
of information and the random character of stock market price changes. However, this 
article made no link with economic equilibrium and, probably for this reason, it was not 
largely circulated. Instead it was  Roberts ( 1959 : 7), a professor at the University of 
Chicago, who 2 rst suggested a link between economic concepts and the random walk 
model by using the “arbitrage proof ” argument that had been popularized by  Modigliani 
and Miller ( 1958 ).  Cowles ( 1960 : 914–5) then made an important step by identifying a 
link between 2 nancial econometric results and economic equilibrium. Finally, two years 
later,  Cootner ( 1962 : 25) linked the random walk model, information, and economic 
equilibrium, and set out the idea of the eL  cient markets theory, although he did not use 
that expression. It was a University of Chicago scholar, Eugene Fama, who formulated 
the eL  cient markets theory, giving it its 2 rst theoretical account in his 1965 doctoral the-
sis. In 1970, Fama developed the connection between security prices fully re: ecting 
available information and martingale behavior for security prices, laying the foundation 
for a future connection between the equivalent martingale measure and absence of arbi-
trage in security prices. At the same time,  Fama et al. ( 1969 ) proposed a statistical meth-
odology that was applicable to testing the “semi-strong form” version of the eL  cient 
markets theory, solidifying the empirical case against the strongest pillar of the old 
2 nance—security analysis. 
 1 e eL  cient markets theory was a crucial building block for modern 2 nancial eco-
nomics. If markets are eL  cient, then techniques for selecting individual securities will 
not generate abnormal returns. In such a world, the best strategy for a rational person 
seeking to maximize expected utility is to diversify optimally. Achieving the highest 
level of expected return for a given level of risk involves eliminating 2 rm-speci2 c risk by 
combining securities into optimal portfolios. Building on  Markowitz ( 1952 , 1959), 
 Treynor ( 1961 ), Sharpe (a PhD student of Markowitz’s) ( Sharpe  1963 , 1964),  Lintner 
( 1965a ,  1965b ), and  Mossin ( 1966 ) made key theoretical contributions to the develop-
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ment of CAPM and the single factor model. A new de2 nition of risk was thus provided. 
It is not the total variance of a security return that determines the expected return. 
Rather, only the systematic risk—that portion of total variance that cannot be diversi-
2 ed away—will be rewarded with expected return. An  ex ante measure of systematic 
risk—the beta of a security—is proposed and the single factor model used to motivate  ex 
post empirical estimation of this parameter. Leading 2 gures of the modern 2 nancial eco-
nomics network, such as Miller, Scholes, and Black, examined the inherent diL  culties in 
determining empirical estimates and developed important techniques designed to pro-
vide such estimates. A collection that promoted these important contributions was the 
volume edited by  Jensen ( 1972 ). 
 1 e combination of these three essential elements—the eL  cient markets theory, the 
Markowitz mean-variance portfolio optimization model, and the CAPM—constitute 
the core elements of analytical progress on modern portfolio theory during the 1960s. 
Just as a decade of improvement and re2 nement of modern portfolio theory was about 
to commence, another kernel of insight contained in  Cootner ( 1964 ) came to fruition 
with the appearance of  Black and Scholes ( 1973 ). 23 1 ough the in: uential Samuelson 
(1967) was missing from the edited volume,  Cootner ( 1964 ) did provide, along with 
other studies of option pricing, an English translation of Bachelier’s 1900 thesis and a 
chapter by C. M. Sprenkle (1964). 1 e Sprenkle chapter points back to Sprenkle (1961) 
where the partial diK erential equation-based solution procedure employed by Black and 
Scholes was initially presented ( MacKenzie 2003,  2007 ).  Black and Scholes ( 1973 ) marks 
the beginning of another scienti2 c movement—concerned with contingent claims pric-
ing—that was to be larger in practical impact and substantially deeper in analytical com-
plexity. 1 e Black-Scholes-Merton model is based on the creation of a replicating 
portfolio which, if the model is clearly speci2 ed and its hypotheses tested, holds out the 
possibility of locally eliminating risk in 2 nancial markets. From a theoretical point of 
view, this model allows for a particularly fruitful connection with the Arrow–Debreu 
general equilibrium model, giving it a degree of reality for the 2 rst time. 24 
 Challenges to the dominant paradigm 
of financial economics: diversification 
of theoretical approaches 
 Hardly had the theoretical framework of the dominant paradigm been laid down when 
a number of works seriously challenged its foundations. A 2 rst set of studies called into 
question the theoretical bases of the dominant paradigm. In 1976, LeRoy showed that 
Fama’s (1970) demonstration of the eL  cient markets theory was tautological and not 
testable. In 1977, the same criticism was leveled at the CAPM:  Roll ( 1977 ) asserted that 
the CAPM is tautological and is hard to test empirically since stock indexes and other 
measures of the market are poor proxies for the CAPM variables.  LeRoy ( 1973 ) and 
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 05/17/2012, SPi
0001551345.INDD   552 5/17/2012   11:24:01 PM
finance in modern economic thought   553
 Lucas ( 1978 ) provided theoretical proofs that eL  cient markets and the martingale 
hypothesis are two distinct ideas: the martingale is neither necessary nor suL  cient for 
an eL  cient market. Although this criticism does not strictly speaking call into question 
the eL  ciency of markets, it shows that the 2 rst objective of the eL  cient markets theory 
(the creation of a link between a mathematical model and the concept of economic equi-
librium) had not been fully achieved. However, the criticism from  Grossman ( 1976 ) and 
 Grossman and Stiglitz ( 1976 , 1980) was more serious: they demonstrated that because 
information involves costs, perfectly informational eL  cient markets are impossible. 
 In parallel with these theoretical attacks, a number of empirical studies very soon 
contradicted the conclusions of the dominant paradigm. At a 1969 conference, Fischer 
Black, Michael Jensen, and Myron Scholes presented data demonstrating that the CAPM 
does not appear to adequately explain the variation in stock returns; their results were 
published three years later ( Black, Jensen, and Scholes  1972 ). Similarly,  Douglas ( 1969 ) 
showed that the CAPM did not provide a complete description of the structure of secu-
rity returns. Similar studies were produced throughout the 1970s. 1 ese empirical stud-
ies gave birth to what is known as the “anomalies literature,” which has become important 
and well organized since the 1980s. During the 1970s, the number of these anomalies 
and their signi2 cance for the dominant paradigm were so great that as early as 1978 a 
special issue of the  Journal of Financial Economics was devoted to them. 
 Here is a quick summary of four of these anomalies. 25 
 3 e January E; ect and the Weekend E; ect 
 Keim (1983) and Reinganum (1983) showed that much of the abnormal return to small 
2 rms occurs during the 2 rst two weeks in January. 1 is anomaly became known as the 
“turn-of-the-year eK ect.” French (1980) observed another calendar anomaly. He noted 
that the average return to the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) composite portfolio was relia-
bly negative over weekends in the period 1953–77. 
 3 e Winner’s Curse 
 1 e winner’s curse points out a tendency for the winning bid in an auction setting to 
exceed the intrinsic value of the item purchased. 1 is suggests that investors are not 
rational enough to be aware of the true value of some assets ( 1 aler  1994 ). 
 Stock Price Volatility 
 Shiller (1981) published a study of the American market demonstrating that the volatil-
ity of stock market prices was greater than expected according to the standard 
framework. 
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 3 e Size E; ect 
 Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981) showed that between 1936 and 1975 small-capitaliza-
tion 2 rms on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) earned average returns higher than 
CAPM predictions. 
 1 e anomalies attracted greater attention than theoretical criticism. Doubtless this 
was because, as Frankfurter and McGoun (2002) explained, anomalies were not initially 
perceived as challenges to the dominant paradigm; on the contrary, they were part of the 
paradigm. Nevertheless, this accumulation of divergences between empirical data and 
theoretical hypotheses set out by the dominant approach led to a theoretical diversi2 ca-
tion ( Schinckus  2008 , 2009a). 
 In the 1980s there emerged two alternative theoretical approaches that took as their 
starting point a questioning of these anomalies and of the main hypotheses of the domi-
nant framework. 1 ese two approaches were behavioral 2 nance and 2 nancial market 
microstructure. Both directly called upon the informational eL  ciency theory that, as we 
have seen, was a crucial element in the birth of modern 2 nancial theory. 
 Financial market microstructure 
 Although the theory of 2 nancial market microstructure has been developing since the 
1980s, 26 the 2 rst works appeared closer to 1970 with an article by  Demsetz ( 1968 ), which 
looked at how to match up buyers and sellers to 2 nd a price when orders do not arrive 
synchronously. In 1971, Jack Treynor, Editor in chief of the  Financial Analysts Journal 
from 1969 to 1981, published a short article under the pseudonym of Walter Bagehot, 
“1 e Only Game in Town,” in which he analyzed the consequences when traders have 
diK erent motivations for trading. Maureen O’Hara, one of the leading lights of this theo-
retical trend, de2 ned market microstructure as “the study of the process and outcomes 
of exchanging assets under a speci2 c set of rules” (1995). Financial market microstruc-
ture focuses on how speci2 c trading mechanisms and how strategic comportments 
aK ect the price formation process. 1 is 2 eld deals with issues of market structure and 
design, price formation and price discovery, transaction and timing cost, information 
and disclosure, and market-maker and investor behavior. 
 Like the dominant paradigm of 2 nancial economics, 2 nancial market microstructure 
takes its theoretical foundation and its method from economics, new microeconomics 
in particular. Some of its hypotheses, however, are completely opposed to the dominant 
paradigm in 2 nancial economics. Likewise, the mathematical formalisms it uses diK er 
from those of the dominant paradigm. 
 As regards mathematical formalisms, this theory largely uses the same mathematics 
as the new microeconomics (it uses asymmetric information) and chie: y employs a 
Bayesian probability approach. On this point it diK ers from the mathematical models 
traditionally used by the dominant paradigm, which mainly employ a frequentist prob-
ability approach. 
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 As regards theoretical hypotheses, a central idea in the theory of market microstruc-
ture is that asset prices do not fully re: ect all available information even if all partici-
pants are rational. Indeed, information may be unequally distributed between, and 
diK erently interpreted by, market participants. 1 is hypothesis stands in total contra-
diction to the eL  cient markets hypothesis defended by the dominant paradigm. 1 e 
2 rst generation of market microstructure literature has shown that trades have both a 
transitory and a permanent impact on prices ( Biais, Glosten, and Spatt  2005 ). For 
instance,  Copeland and Galai ( 1983 ) showed that a dealer who cannot distinguish 
between informed and uninformed investors will always set a positive spread to com-
pensate for the expected loss that he will incur if there is a positive probability of some 
investors being informed.  Kyle ( 1985 ) suggests that informed dealers can develop strate-
gic behavior to pro2 t from their information by concealing their orders among those 
of non-informed dealers. While informed dealers thus maximize their own pro2 ts on 
the basis of the information they hold, their behavior restricts the dissemination of the 
information.  O’Hara ( 2003 ) presents another example of results that contradict the 
dominant paradigm. In this article, she shows that, if information is asymmetrically dis-
tributed, and if those who do not have information know that others know more, con-
trary to the suggestions of the CAPM, we will not get an equilibrium where everyone 
holds the market portfolio. 
 Behavioral < nance 
 1 e second alternative approach is behavioral 2 nance. 
 In 1985 Werner F. M. De Bondt and Richard 1 aler published “Does the Stock Market 
Overreact?” eK ectively marking the start of what has become known as behavioral 
2 nance. Behavioral 2 nance studies the in: uence of psychology on the behavior of 2 nan-
cial practitioners and the subsequent eK ect on markets. 27 Its theoretical framework is 
drawn mainly from behavioral economics. 
 Behavioral economics uses social, cognitive, and emotional factors to understand the 
economic decisions of economic agents performing economic functions, and their 
eK ects on market prices and resource allocation. It is primarily concerned with the 
bounds of rationality of economic agents. 1 e 2 rst important article came from 
Kahneman 28 and Tversky (1979), who used cognitive psychology to explain various 
divergences of economic decision-making from neoclassical theory. 
 1 ere exists as yet no uni2 ed theory of behavioral 2 nance. 29 According to  Schinckus 
( 2009b ), however, it is possible to characterize this new school of thought on the basis of 
three hypotheses common to all the literature:
  • 1 e existence of behavioral biases aK ecting investor behavior. 1 is is a fundamen-
tal hypothesis that arises directly out of observations conducted in laboratories by 
cognitive psychologists. 1 ese behavioral biases are thought to be the main cause 
of diK erences between the observed behavior of agents and the rational behavior 
on which standard 2 nancial economics is based. 
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  • 1 e existence of bias in investors’ perception of the environment that aK ects their 
decisions. Behavioral 2 nance thus presumes that the environment is opaque to 
individuals. 1 is hypothesis comes from observations conducted in the labora-
tory and diverges from the dominant paradigm, which presumes that the context 
is completely transparent to investors’ perceptions. 
  • 1 e existence of systematic errors in the processing of information by individuals, 
which aK ects the market’s informational eL  ciency. 1 e markets are therefore pre-
sumed to be informationally ineL  cient. 1 is hypothesis is the cause of the 2 rst 
two hypotheses. 
 Like those of 2 nancial market microstructure, the hypotheses of behavioral 2 nance are 
opposed to those of the dominant paradigm. In addition, these two alternative schools 
agree on one major point: although they oppose the dominant paradigm, both draw 
their theoretical origins from economics. 1 rough both these schools we see the impor-
tance of economics in the development of modern 2 nancial theory, which demonstrates 
the diL  culty of reducing modern 2 nancial theory to a simple “mathematical 2 nance.” 
 In parallel with this theoretical diversi2 cation founded on economics, certain foun-
dations of the dominant paradigm of 2 nancial economics are today being questioned by 
two new research 2 elds outside of economics. 
 Financial economics challenged by 
disciplines outside of economics: 
social studies of financial markets 
and econophysics 
 As we have explained, so-called “modern” 2 nancial theory is intrinsically linked with eco-
nomics. Not only did economics provide the theoretical content necessary for the emer-
gence of the dominant paradigm, but it also enabled the development of the two main 
alternative approaches, behavioral 2 nance and 2 nancial market microstructure. But 
although economics has given theoretical content to modern 2 nancial theory, certain fun-
damentals of the dominant paradigm are today being challenged by two new research 2 elds 
from outside economics. Two major approaches born outside 2 nancial economics emerged 
since the 1990s: social studies of 2 nancial markets and econophysics. Both challenge the 
foundations of the dominant paradigm of 2 nancial economics. 1 ese two theoretical 
trends are likely to in: uence the hypotheses of 2 nancial economics in the coming years. 
 Social studies of < nancial markets 
 Social studies of 2 nance started to emerge in the 1990s. 1 is multidisciplinary 2 eld, 
which I will not cover here (it is dealt with elsewhere in this volume), results from the 
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application to 2 nancial markets of social science disciplines such as sociology, anthro-
pology, and social studies of science. 1 e sociology of 2 nancial markets approaches 
2 nancial markets from a sociological perspective ( Cardon, Lehingue, and Muniesa 
 2000 ;  Knorr Cetina and Preda  2005 ;  MacKenzie  2006 ;  Preda  2009 ). It seeks to provide 
an adequate sociological conceptualization of 2 nancial markets, and examines who the 
actors within them are, how they operate, within which networks, and how these net-
works are structured. One of the main concepts advanced by this 2 eld is the idea of per-
formativity. According to  MacKenzie ( 2006 ) and  MacKenzie, Muniesa, and Siu ( 2007 ), 
2 nancial models have performativity; they do not just describe markets, they transform 
them. 
 Econophysics 
 1 e second main approach that was born outside 2 nancial economics is econophysics. 30 
Very broadly speaking, econophysics refers to the extension of physics to the study of 
problems generally considered as falling within the sphere of economics. 31 Financial 
economics, and more generally 2 nance, are also subject to the in: uence of physics. One 
of the 2 rst authors to bring physics closer to the 2 nancial domain was Jules Regnault in 
the second half of the nineteenth century. 32 In the twentieth century, a number of phys-
ics concepts played a part in the development of modern 2 nancial theory. But as 
McCauley points out (2004), in spite of these theoretical and historical links between 
physics and 2 nance, econophysics represents a fundamentally new approach. Its practi-
tioners are not economists taking their inspiration from the work of physicists to develop 
their discipline, as has been seen repeatedly in the history of economics. 1 is time, it is 
physicists that are going beyond the boundaries of their discipline, using their methods 
to study various problems thrown up by social sciences. Econophysicists are not attempt-
ing to integrate physics concepts into 2 nancial economics as it exists today, but are rather 
seeking to ignore, even to deny this discipline in an endeavor to replace the theoretical 
framework that currently dominates it with a new framework derived directly from sta-
tistical physics. 33 
 1 is movement was initiated in the 1970s, when certain physicists began publishing 
articles devoted to study of social phenomena, such as the formation of social groups 
( Weidlich  1971 ) or social mimetism ( Callen and Shapiro  1974 ). 34 1 e next decade con-
2 rmed this new theoretical trend (labeled  sociophysics  35 ), as the number of physicists 
publishing papers devoted to the explanation of social phenomena and the number of 
themes analyzed continued to increase, examples being industrial strikes ( Galam, 
Gefen, and Shapir  1982 ), democratic structures ( Galam  1986 ), and elections ( Galam 
 2004 ,  Ferreira and Dionisio  2008 ). 
 In the 1990s physicists 36 turned their attention to economics, and particularly 2 nan-
cial economics, giving rise to econophysics. Although the movement’s oL  cial birth 
announcement came in a 1996 article by  Stanley et al. ( 1996 ), 37 econophysics was at that 
time still a young, ill-de2 ned current.  Mantegna and Stanley ( 1999 : 2) de2 ned econo-
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physics as “a quantitative approach using ideas, models, conceptual and computational 
methods of statistical physics.” Research conducted in this 2 eld mainly concerns the 
study of 2 nancial phenomena, ignoring other themes analyzed by economics. 38 
 Econophysics has two main strengths that allow it to challenge the dominant para-
digm of 2 nancial economics: a better explanation of empirical facts, and mathematical 
models that are more general than those used by 2 nancial economists. 
 Believing that 2 nancial market prices change more frequently and in a more orderly 
manner than presumed by the Gaussian model on which 2 nancial economics is based, 
econophysicists use Lévy distributions to describe 2 nancial data. Such distributions bet-
ter describe the statistical distributions observed on 2 nancial markets. 39 1 is approach 
allows them to integrate a number of stylized facts such as “fat tails,” 40 “volatility persist-
ence,” 41 and “volatility clustering” 42 that the traditional approach cannot explain 
(Jovanovic and Schinckus 2010a). 
 Econophysics’ second strength lies in the use of mathematical models that generalize 
those used in 2 nancial economics. 1 e main mathematical tools used by econophysi-
cists are Lévy processes, which provide a more general mathematical framework, mak-
ing Gaussian or Poisson processes particular cases. 1 is use of Lévy processes, then, 
allows econophysics to provide a more general theoretical framework than that of 2 nan-
cial economics, which uses Gaussian distribution. 
 Notes 
  1. Modern 2 nancial theory and 2 nancial economics are synonymous. We use the two terms 
interchangeably here. 
 2. Examples are the works of  Jules Regnault ( 1863 ),  Louis Bachelier ( 1900 ),  Vincenz Bronzin 
( 1908 ),  Alfred Cowles ( 1933 , 1944), and  Holbrook Working ( 1934 , 1935). 
  3. Let me specify that the absence of theory characterizes all existing works written between 
the 1930s and the 1960s.  Cowles ( 1933 ),  Working ( 1934 ), and  Kendall ( 1953 ) were the 2 rst 
English and American authors to analyze the random character of stock prices, but none 
of them put forward a theory to explain the phenomenon. 1 eoreticians pointed out the 
absence of theoretical explanations during the 1950s. 1 is was particularly striking aD er 
the Koopmans–Vining debate in the late 1940s, which set the NBER against the Cowles 
Commission over the lack of theoretical explanations and the need to link measurement 
with theory ( Jovanovic  2008 ). 
  4. 1 ese two publications gave a rigorous mathematical framework to de2 nitions, hypothe-
ses, and results that constitute the heart of modern 2 nancial theory. 
  5. Doob is without question the American mathematician who has had the greatest in: u-
ence on modern probability theory in the United States. On Doob, see  Bingham ( 2005 ). 
  6. William Feller immigrated to the United States in 1939. He was one of the 2 rst defenders 
of the axiomatization proposed by Kolmogorov (Shafer and Vovk 2005). At the collo-
quium on mathematical probability held in Geneva in October 1937, Feller declared that 
Kolmogorov’s well-known axiomatization was the point of departure for most modern 
theoretical research in probability (Shafer and Vovk 2005: 57). Moreover, Feller’s  An 
Introduction to Probability ! eory and Its Application (1950) was, like Doob’s 1953 
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 publication, one of the works that most strongly in: uenced modern probability theory in 
the United States. 
  7. Doob “2 nally provided the de2 nitive treatment of stochastic processes within the meas-
ure-theoretic framework, in his  Stochastic Processes (1953)” (Shafer and Vovk 2005: 60). 
Doob worked on martingale theory from 1940 to 1950. Knowledge of martingale theory 
was spread gradually during the 1950s, mostly through  Stochastic Processes ( Meyer  2009 ). 
1 is book “became the Bible of the new probability” ( Meyer  2009 : 3). 
  8. For a retrospective on Markowitz,  see Rubinstein ( 2002 ) and  Markowitz ( 1999 ). 
  9. 1 e mathematical properties of random variables are that the expected value of a weighted 
sum is the weighted sum of the expected values, while the variance of a weighted sum is 
not the weighted sum of the variances (because we have to take covariance into account). 
 10. 1 is theorem can actually be thought of as an extension of the “separation theorem” origi-
nally developed by Irving  Fisher ( 1930 ). For an introduction to the work of Fisher,  see 
Dimand and Geanakoplos ( 2005 ). For a retrospective look at the Modigliani and Miller 
model,  see Miller ( 1988 ) and  Rubinstein ( 2003 ). 
  11. 1 e new research path was not accepted by economists until the 1960s. Milton Friedman’s 
reaction to Harry Markowitz’s defense of his PhD thesis gives a good illustration. Friedman 
declared, “It’s not economics, it’s not mathematics, it’s not business administration,” and 
Jacob Marschak, who supervised Markowitz during his PhD, added, “It’s not literature” 
( Markowitz  2004 ). See also  Rubinstein ( 2002 ). Another illustration is provided by the dis-
semination of the 2 rst works of 2 nancial economics, which only truly started to circulate 
from the 1960s onward. For example, citations of Markowitz’ 1952 study really only began 
in the mid-1960s, once the founding articles of the CAPM had appeared (Jovanovic and 
Schinckus 2010c). 
 12.  See Mackenzie ( 2006 : 72–3),  Whitley ( 1986a ,  1986b ), Fourcade and Khurana (2009), and 
 Bernstein ( 1992 ). 
 13. 1 e same issues were raised in training sessions given by Financial Analysts Seminar, one 
of the leading professional organizations connected with 2 nancial markets ( Kennedy  1966 ). 
 14. David Durand, professor at MIT, used his prestigious academic position to question the 
rise of modern 2 nancial economics ( Durand  1959 , 1968).  Mackenzie ( 2007 ) observes: 
“[w]hen in 1968 David Durand, a leading 2 gure from the older form of the academic 
study of 2 nance, inspected the mathematical models that were beginning to transform his 
2 eld he commented that ‘1 e new 2 nance men . . . have lost virtually all contact with terra 
2 rma.’ ” 
  15. 1 is theory is sometimes called a hypothesis. But from a methodological point of view, it 
is a fully : edged theory, even if it is used as a hypothesis in some models. 
 16. 1 e martingale model had been introduced to model the random character of stock mar-
ket prices by  Samuelson ( 1965 ) and  Mandelbrot ( 1966 ). 
  17. By de2 nition, a martingale model,  E ( P t +l |Φ)– P t =0, Φ t is a 2 lter, that is, using the terminol-
ogy of 2 nancial economics, a set of information that increases over time. 
 18. 1 is section is based on Poitras and  Jovanovic ( 2010 ) and  Jovanovic ( 2010 ). For a histori-
cal perspective,  see also Bernstein ( 1992 ),  MacKenzie ( 2006 ),  Mehrling ( 2005 ), and 
Jovanovic and Schinckus (2010c). 
 19. A notable exception is Eugene Fama. It was expected that he would receive the award in 
2008, but the 2 nancial crisis worked against him. 
 20. Although the contributions of Fischer Black (1938–95) were explicitly recognized, he was 
not a named recipient because the prize cannot be awarded posthumously, and the award 
was given to Merton and Scholes. 
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 21. We might also add the arbitrage pricing theory. 1 is theory was initiated by the economist 
 Stephen Ross in  1976 . It assumes that the expected return of a 2 nancial asset is in: uenced 
by various macroeconomic factors or theoretical market indices. 
 22. In fact, there are several de2 nitions of this theory. 1 e de2 nition has changed depending 
on the emphasis placed on a given feature by each author. For instance, Fama et al . (1969) 
de2 ned an eL  cient market as “a market that adjusts rapidly to new information”;  Jensen 
( 1978 ) considered that “a market is eL  cient with respect to information set  θ t if it is impos-
sible to make economic pro2 t by trading on the basis of information set  θ t ”; according to 
 Malkiel ( 1992 ) “the market is said to be eL  cient with respect to some information set . . . if 
security prices would be unaK ected by revealing that information to all participants. 
Moreover, eL  ciency with respect to an information set . . . implies that it is impossible to 
make economic pro2 ts by trading on the basis of [that information set].” 
 23.  See Mehrling ( 2005 ) on Fischer Black, and  MacKenzie ( 2006 ) for a sociology analysis of 
the in: uence of this model. 
 24. 1 e Black-Scholes-Merton model has been associated  ex post with Arrow–Debreu general 
equilibrium.  Arrow and Debreu ( 1954 ) and later  Debreu ( 1959 ) were able to model an 
uncertain economy and show the existence of at least a competitive general equilibrium 
which, moreover, had the property of being Pareto optimal. 1 is model thus “for the 2 rst 
time gave reality to chapter 7 of Gérard Debreu’s book  ! éorie de la valeur . . . in which he 
talks of complete markets, that is, markets in which any contingent asset is replicable by 
basic assets” ( Géman  1997 : 50). 
 25.  Schwert ( 2003 ) provides a fairly exhaustive review of anomalies. 
 26. 1 e term “market microstructure” was coined by  Mark Garman ( 1976 ), who studied order 
: ux dynamics (the dealer must set a price so as to not run out of stock or cash). For a 
presentation of the discipline,  see O’Hara ( 1995 ),  Madhavan ( 2000 ), and  Biais, Glosten, 
and Spatt ( 2005 ). 
 27.  See Schinckus ( 2009a ,  2009b ) for a presentation of this school and its positioning vis-à-
vis the dominant paradigm. 
 28. In 2002 Daniel Kahneman received the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in 
Memory of Alfred Nobel for his work on the integration of psychology with economics. 
 29. Note that  Shefrin ( 2002 ) made a 2 rst attempt to unify the theory. 
 30. On the emergence and analysis of econophysics, see Gingras and Schinckus (2) and 
Jovanovic and Schinckus (2010a, 2010b). 
 31. 1 e in: uence of physics on economics is nothing new. A number of writers have studied 
the “physical attraction” ( Le Gall  2002 : 5) exerted by economics on hard sciences:  Mirowski 
( 1989 ) extensively highlighted contributions of physics to the development of marginalist 
economics and mathematical economics.  Ingrao and Israel ( 1990 ) drew renewed attention 
to the in: uences of mechanics in the conceptualization of equilibrium in economics. 
 Ménard ( 1981 ),  Schabas ( 1990 ), and  Maas ( 2005 ) also highlighted the role of physics in the 
economic works of Cournot and those of Jevons. 
 32.  See Jovanovic ( 2000 ) and  Jovanovic and Le Gall ( 2001 ) on this subject. 
 33. 1 is explicit desire for methodological rupture contains the Kuhnian idea of the need for 
theoretical discontinuity in order to develop a new paradigm. 
 34. Regarding the emergence and history of sociophysics,  see Galam ( 2004 ). 
 35. 1 is term was proposed by Serge Galam in a 1982 article. 
 36. 1 e in: uence of physics on the study of 2 nancial markets is not new, as witnessed by the 
work of  Bachelier ( 1900 ) and  Black and Scholes ( 1973 ). Nevertheless, we cannot yet refer to 
Black and Scholes’s model as econophysics in the term’s current meaning, since it was com-
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pletely integrated into the dominant theoretical current of economics and 2 nance ( Kast 
 1991 ). Econophysics is not an “adapted import” of the methodology used in physics; rather, 
it is closer to a “methodological invasion.” We return to this point in the next section. 
 37. 1 is article is also the origin of the term  econophysics . 
 38. Although the application of statistical physics to economic touches on a number of sub-
jects, such as corporate revenue ( Okuyama, Takayasu, and Takayasu  1999 ), the emergence 
of money ( Shinohara and Gunji  2001 ) and global demand ( Donangelo and Sneppen 
 2000 ), these 2 elds are marginal to judge by the number of articles published by physicists 
on the subject of 2 nancial markets. It is no accident, then, that the characteristics of 
econophysics mentioned by  Rickles ( 2007 : 4) all relate to 2 nance. 
 39. On this point, we should remember that economists and 2 nanciers have long been inter-
ested in the leptokurtic character of price distributions ( Louçã  2007 : 219;  Jovanovic and 
Schinckus  2013 ). 
 40. 1 e distributions of 2 nancial returns are more leptokurtic (with heavy tails) and exhibit a 
larger number of extreme events than a Gaussian framework would generate. 
 41. According to the theoretical framework used by the dominant paradigm, security prices 
have  no memory. Technically, however, the volatility has a slowly decaying autocorrelation 
showing a dependency between stock market returns. 
 42. In reality, we can observe several periods of large : uctuations and periods of small : uc-
tuations. In other words, periods of intense : uctuations and low : uctuations tend to clus-
ter together. 
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